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Answer to the editor
(paper DA9603 R1)
Dear editor,
Below please find the answer to the referee, as well as the corresponding modifications.
With our best regards,
Michel Grabisch and Toma´sˇ Kroupa
Answer to the referee
We will try to answer to your main concerns and claims, some of which are imprecise or even plainly wrong.
• The authors either do not know or just to not tell the reader that their 0-normalized supermodular functions
on the lattice D [...] are exactly the restrictions of the 0-normalized supermodular functions v on the
Boolean lattice 2N of all subsets. [...] So Section 3 becomes right away superfluous. [...]
It is not true, in general, that a 0-normalized game on 2N is still 0-normalized when restricted to D. It
suffices to take as an example D given in Fig 2.1. on p.4. Then a 0-normalized classical game v satisfies
v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = v(4) = 0, the other values being arbirary. Now, consider the restriction v′ of
v to D. If v′ were 0-normalized, its Mo¨bius transform should satisfy vˆ′(123) = 0. However, vˆ′(123) =
v′(123)− v′(23) 6= 0, in general. It is indeed true that games on D can be seen as retrictions of games on
2N . For a given game v on D, there exists infinitely many extensions v′ on 2N . However, this in general
does not help for the analysis of games on D, since this restriction induces many intricacies, and properties
true for games on 2N are no more true for games on D. For example, the core of games on 2N is either
empty or it is a closed bounded polyhedron. But the core of games on D becomes unbounded as soon as
D 6= 2N . This is why there is abundant literature on games “with restricted cooperation”, that is, the games
defined on some subcollection of 2N .
• D is closed under unions and intersections but not necessarily under set complements. Hence all properties
of supermodular functions on the boolean latice 2N which can be proved without an appeal to complemen-
tation carry over verbatim to D-restricted supermodular functions. To illustrate this point [...] Hence the
inequalities [(7.2)] must hold in particular for the downsets systems D. [...]
Again, properties true in the Boolean case do not necesserily remain true in the restricted case. Now, to
answer more precisely to the fact that if complements are not used in the proof, then the proof remains valid
in the restricted case, this is true only up to the condition that all sets considered in the proof belong to D.
For example, taking the mentioned proof of Th. 7.1, one line after (7.4), we must be careful that A ∪ {i}
belongs toD, which is not always true even ifA ∈ D. By the fact that the lattice is ranked, this is fortunately
true, otherwise the proof would not work. Hence, proofs from the Boolean case cannot be used verbatim
for the restricted case, even if complements are not mentioned.
• The authors insist on calling theorem 4.1. “new” because its proof supposedly avoids the well-known
combinatorial greedy algorithm and use “game theoretic” language in order to arrive at the same math-
ematical result. However already Shapley’s classic charaterization of the extreme points of the core of a
supermodular game implies theorem 4.1. [...]
As it is clearly written in the proof and in Remark 4.1., we do not claim any novelty here, except point 4 of
the theorem, which is very simple to prove. However, it is not true that the result of Shapley on classical
games implies Th. 4.1. Again, properties true for the Boolean case do not carry over the restricted case.
As explained above, the core of games on D becomes unbounded. Therefore, some extreme points may
1
Revision notes
Click here to download Revision notes: letter-revision-dam18R1.tex
disappear because of extreme rays. The result for games in D was proved the first time by Fujishige and
Tomizawa in 1985, and later reproved by Derks and Gilles in 1995, and the proof is less simple than in the
Boolean case. We mention these references in the revised version.
• Also theorem 5.1. is not new in the sense that the proof of the (already known) boolean case does not make
use of the family of feasible sets being closed under complements but only under unions and intersections.
Hence a boolean proof would carry over identically to downsets systems.
For the reasons explained above, this is not true in general. Moreover, as explained in the introduction, our
proof follows quite a different way and it is also much simpler.
• It is finally not clear to me what the game theoretic benefit of the extreme ray characterization in theorem
5.1 is and the paper does not elaborate on this. To check the conditions of the theorem seems no easier
than simply checking by linear algebra whether the tight inequalities have a unique solution. Example 5.1
is perhaps meant to suggest that it helps to enumerate extreme rays better. But is this really so? Is there
any advantage over the straightforward linear algebra method which would enmerate all full-dimensional
subsystems of inequalities and check if the solution of the associted equality system is feasible? If so, which
is the advantage?
The linear-algebraic characterization of extreme rays provides a universally valid method for any pointed
polyhedral cone. Our approach based on Theorem 5.1 uses the structure of the objects we are dealing with
(supermodular functions on finite distributive lattices). Hence, one does not need to assemble all the relevant
linear systems “blindly” using the former linear-algebraic technique. Indeed, it is known by the criterion
of Theorem 5.1 that the shape of such systems is fully determined by the core structure (=the map sending
supermodular games to the collection of vertices indexed by compatible permutations). Loosely speaking,
a supermodular game is extreme if, and only if, the core structure is rigid in sense that the asssociated linear
system is uniquely solvable.
Admittedly our goal was not to provide any efficient algorithm expediating search for generators of ex-
treme rays. Neither we mention computational complexity in any part of our paper. So you are right that
our method is only theoretical as we have not studied its performance. On the other hand, the insight
provided by Theorem 5.1 can prove to be valuable from the viewpoint of classification (characterization)
of extreme rays. This idea is partially supported by Corollary 6.1, which shows that the face lattice of
supermodular cone is isomorphic to the corresponding family of core structures. Now, the latter can be
used to explain the shape of cores of extreme supermodular games by means of certain basic transforma-
tions. More details about such tranformations can be found in the unpublished paper of M. Studeny´ (see
https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.06599), which assumes that the lattice is Boolean. Our plan is to
move in the direction of classifying extreme rays for games over distributive lattices in the near future.
We have included a remark clarifying our approach and the above explanation of the meaning of Theorem
5.1 directly in the revised version of our paper.
2
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
The cone of supermodular games on finite distributive lattices
Michel Grabischa, Toma´sˇ Kroupab,∗
aParis School of Economics, University of Paris I, Paris, France
bThe Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Information Theory and Automation, Prague, Czech
Republic
Abstract
In this article we study supermodular functions on finite distributive lattices. Relaxing
the assumption that the domain is a powerset of a finite set, we focus on geometrical
properties of the polyhedral cone of such functions. Specifically, we generalize the cri-
terion for extremality and study the face lattice of the supermodular cone. An explicit
description of facets by the corresponding tight linear inequalities is provided.
Keywords: supermodular/submodular function, core, coalitional game, polyhedral cone
1. Introduction
Supermodular functions, and their duals, submodular functions, play a central roˆle
in many fields of discrete mathematics, most notably combinatorial optimization (rank
function of polymatroids: see, e.g., the monograph of Fujishige [8]), game theory (charac-
teristic function of transferable utility games: see, e.g., Peleg and Sudho¨lter [14]), decision
theory (capacity, Choquet expected utility [18]), lattice theory, etc.
Up to duality, all above examples fall into the category of supermodular games, that
is, supermodular functions vanishing at the empty set. They form a polyhedral cone,
whose facets have been found by Kuipers et al. [13]. In his 1971 seminal paper, Shapley
[19] gave the 37 extreme supermodular games for n = 4 players, and noted that for larger
values of n, little can be said. Later, Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner [17] found all extreme
supermodular functions by representing each such function as a maximum over shifted
additive games. Recently, Studeny´ and Kroupa [21] revisited the problem and provided
another characterization of extremality, in a sense dual to the result of Rosenmu¨ller and
Weidner, but easier to use.
The aim of this paper is to (re)establish in a more general framework and in a simpler
way the above results (together with new ones) describing the cone of supermodular
games, taking advantage of classical results on polyhedra. We consider games defined
on a finite distributive lattice L, generated by a partial order  on the set of players N .
The poset induces some relation between the players, which can be interpreted in various
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: michel.grabisch@univ-paris1.fr (Michel Grabisch), kroupa@utia.cas.cz
(Toma´sˇ Kroupa)
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ways: precedence constraints (Faigle and Kern [6]), hierarchy (Grabisch and Xie [11]), or
permission structure (van den Brink and Gilles [4]). Feasible coalitions of players, i.e.,
those for which the game is defined, are down-sets on (N,), and they form a distributive
lattice L. By Birkhoff’s theorem, every finite distributive lattice is of this form. The
standard case L = 2N is recovered when the poset (N,) is flat, i.e., when all players
are incomparable (no order relation between the players).
A large amount of research has been done concerning games on distributive lattices,
as well as on other ordered structures (see a survey in [9]). Most of them are related to
the solution concepts such as Shapley value or the core. However, up to our knowledge,
there is no systematic study on the geometric properties of the cone of supermodular
games defined on distributive lattices. Note that it is very natural to take a distributive
lattice as a domain of a supermodular function since supermodular inequalities involve
only the lattice joins and meets. The present paper addresses precisely this point. In
the same time we generalize and prove results about extreme rays and facets in a more
concise way.
Section 2 collects background on distributive lattices. Coalitional games are intro-
duced in Section 3, in particular 0-normalized and supermodular games. Section 4 con-
tains basic facts about 0-normalized supermodular games and the cone thereof. The
extreme rays are characterized in Section 5. Basically, a supermodular game generates
an extreme ray if and only if a certain system of linear equalities has for a solution those
vectors which are proportional to the marginal vectors of the game. Section 6 describes
the facial structure of the cone by a certain collection of finite lattices, namely the tight
sets associated with compatible permutations of the poset (N,). The facets of the cone
of supermodular games are characterized in Section 7.
2. Finite distributive lattices
In this section we introduce basic notions and results about Birkhoff duality between
finite distributive lattices and finite posets. The reader is referred to [20, Chapter 3] for
all the unexplained notions concerning lattices and partially ordered sets (posets).
Let L be a finite distributive lattice whose join and meet are denoted by ∨ and ∧,
respectively. A partial order 6 on L is defined by a 6 b if a∨ b = b, for all a, b ∈ L. Since
L is finite there exists a top element ⊤ and a bottom element ⊥ in L. We always assume
that L is non-trivial in sense that ⊤ 6= ⊥. An element a ∈ L is called join-irreducible if
a 6= ⊥ and the identity a = b ∨ c holding for some b, c ∈ L implies a = b or a = c. In
particular, a ∈ L with a 6= ⊥ is an atom if the condition b 6 a for all b ∈ L implies b = ⊥
or b = a. The join-irreducible elements of a Boolean lattice are precisely its atoms. For
any a, b ∈ L such that a 6 b, we define an order interval
[a, b] := {c ∈ L | a 6 c 6 b}.
An element a ∈ L is join-irreducible if, and only if, there is a unique a− ∈ L such that
a− 6 a, a− 6= a, and [a−, a] = {a−, a}. The set of all join-irreducible elements of L is
denoted by J (L) and it is always endowed with the partial order 6 of L restricted to
J (L). Thus, (J (L),6) becomes a nonempty finite poset.
Let N 6= ∅ be a finite set and  be a partial order on N . A down-set in (N,) is a
subset A ⊆ N such that if i ∈ A and j  i for j ∈ N , then j ∈ A. For any i ∈ N , we
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1
2 3
4
∅
{2} {3} {4}
{2, 3} {2, 4} {3, 4}
{1, 2, 3} {2, 3, 4}
N
Figure 2.1: The poset (N,) with the corresponding lattice of down-sets D(N,)
denote
↓ i := {j ∈ N | j  i} and ⇓ i := ↓ i \ {i}.
Both ↓ i and ⇓ i are down-sets in (N,). A down-set A is called principal if there exists
some i ∈ N such that A = ↓ i. By D(N,) we denote the set of all down-sets in (N,).
It is easy to see that D(N,) is closed under the set-theoretic union ∪ and intersection
∩. Thus, D(N,) is a finite distributive lattice whose order is the inclusion ⊆ between
sets, and whose top and bottom element is N and ∅, respectively. The lattice D(N,) is
the most general example of a finite distributive lattice by the following classical result.
Birkhoff’s representation theorem. Let L be a finite distributive lattice. Then the
mapping
FL : L → D(J (L),6)
defined by FL(a) := {b ∈ J (L) | b 6 a} is a lattice isomorphism.
The converse part of duality explains what are join-irreducible elements in the lattice of
down-sets D(N,).
Proposition 2.1. Let (N,) be a finite poset. Then the mapping
↓ : (N,)→ J (D(N,))
sending every i ∈ N to the principal down-set ↓ i is an order isomorphism.
Example 2.1. Let N := {1, 2, 3, 4} be equipped with the partial order  captured by
the Hasse diagram in Figure 2.1 on the left. On the right-hand side we depict the lattice
of down-sets D(N,). There are four join-irreducible elements in D(N,), namely {2},
{3}, {4}, and {1, 2, 3}.
3. Coalitional games on finite distributive lattices
We use the standard terminology of cooperative game theory; see [14]. The player
set is defined to be N := {1, . . . , n}, for some integer n ≥ 1. Any subset of N is called
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a coalition. We allow for a situation in which players i, j ∈ N are compared using a
partial order  on N . Hence, (N,) is assumed to be a finite poset. Birkhoff duality
(see Section 2) entails that the partial order  on N restricts the formation of coalitions
A ⊆ N , provided that the coalition structure is modeled by the lattice of down-sets in
(N,).
Convention. Throughout the paper we will always assume that the set of all possible
coalitions in (N,) is the lattice of down-sets D(N,). We use the abbreviations
L := D(N,) and J := J (D(N,)).
From now on, all possible coalitions are assumed to be precisely the sets belonging to
a fixed lattice L and J denotes its subset of all join-irreducible elements. Coalitional
games are modeled as real functions v on the set L of feasible coalitions A, where the real
value v(A) indicate the amount of utility resulting from the joint cooperation of players
in the coalition A.
Definition 3.1. A function v : L → R satisfying v(∅) = 0 is a (coalitional) game. A
game v is called
• supermodular if v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) ≥ v(A) + v(B),
• modular if v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) = v(A) + v(B),
• monotone if v(A) ≤ v(B) whenever A ⊆ B,
• nonnegative if v(A) ≥ 0,
for all A,B ∈ L.
Let G(L) be the set of all games on L. We consider these subsets of G(L):
GS(L) := {v ∈ G(L) | v is supermodular},
GM (L) := {v ∈ G(L) | v is modular}.
A modular game is also called a valuation (over R) in literature; see [2, 20]. Note that
G(L) is a real vector space isomorphic to RL\{∅} and therefore dimG(L) = |L| − 1. One
of the bases in G(L) is found very easily. For each nonempty A ∈ L, the unanimity game
uA is defined by
uA(B) :=
{
1 A ⊆ B,
0 otherwise,
for all B ∈ L.
Then {uA | ∅ 6= A ∈ L} forms a basis in G(L). The coordinates of any game v ∈
G(L) with respect to this basis are calculated using the Mo¨bius inversion formula [15].
Specifically, the Mo¨bius function of L is the function µL : L2 → R given recursively as
µL(X,Y ) :=


1 X = Y,
−
∑
X⊆Z⊂Y
µL(X,Z) X ⊂ Y,
0 otherwise,
for all X,Y ∈ L.
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The Mo¨bius transform of v ∈ G(L) is the game vˆ ∈ G(L) defined by
vˆ(B) :=
∑
C⊆B
v(C) · µL(C,B), B ∈ L.
Lemma 3.1. For any v ∈ G(L), we have
vˆ(B) =
∑
C⊆B
v(C) · (−1)|B\C|, B ∈ L,
where the sum above is over all C ∈ L such that [C,B] is a Boolean sublattice of L.
Proof. It suffices to apply the observation from [20, Example 3.9.6]. Specifically, since
the lattice L is finite and distributive, the formula for Mo¨bius function µL simplifies as
µL(X,Y ) =
{
(−1)|Y \X| if [X,Y ] is a Boolean lattice,
0 otherwise,
for every X,Y ∈ L with X ⊆ Y .
Thus, any v ∈ G(L) can be expressed as a linear combination v =
∑
∅6=A∈L vˆ(A) ·uA,
which gives
v(A) =
∑
B⊆A
vˆ(B), A ∈ L. (3.1)
The set of valuations (modular games) GM (L) is a vector subspace of G(L). By Rota’s
lemma [16] any valuation on L is uniquely determined by its restriction to the set of
join-irreducible elements J . It follows that the dimension of linear space GM (L) equals
|J | = n. This means that the polyhedral cone of supermodular games GS(L) is not
pointed as it includes the non-trivial linear space GM (L). However, we can always
consider the elements of GS(L) modulo GM (L). To this end we introduce the following
notion.
Definition 3.2. A game v ∈ G(L) is said to be 0-normalized if
vˆ(A) = 0, for all A ∈ J .
Let G⋆(L) be the set of all 0-normalized games on L.
Note that the notion of 0-normalized game on a distributive lattice L coincides with
the usual concept of 0-normalized game in cooperative game theory (see [14, Definition
2.1.13]). Indeed, when L is the Boolean lattice 2N of all subsets of N , then the only
join-irreducible elements in 2N are exactly the atoms in 2N , that is, J = {{i} | i ∈ N}.
If v is 0-normalized in sense of Definition 3.2, from (3.1) we get v({i}) = vˆ({i}) = 0 for
all i ∈ N , which is exactly the definition of 0-normalized coalitional game on 2N .
Lemma 3.2. A game v ∈ G(L) is 0-normalized if and only if v(A) = v(A−) for all
A ∈ J , where A− is the unique element covered by A.
Proof. Let A ∈ J . Then, for any B ∈ L with B ⊆ A, the order interval [B,A] is a
Boolean sublattice of L if, and only if, either B = A or B = A−. Hence, Lemma 3.1
yields vˆ(A) = v(A) − v(A−).
5
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For any v ∈ G(L), put
v⋆ := v −
∑
B∈J
vˆ(B) · uB.
It is easy to see that G⋆(L) = {v⋆ | v ∈ G(L)}. We claim that, for any v ∈ G(L), there
exist uniquely determined w ∈ G⋆(L) and m ∈ GM (L) such that
v = w +m. (3.2)
Indeed, it suffices to define w := v⋆, m :=
∑
B∈J vˆ(B) ·uB, and observe that m ∈ GM (L).
Let
G⋆S(L) := GS(L) ∩G
⋆(L).
Then G⋆S(L) = {v
⋆ | v ∈ GS(L)} and Lemma 3.2 says that G⋆S(L) contains exactly those
supermodular games satisfying v(A) = v(A−), for all A ∈ J . Moreover, the convex cone
G⋆S(L) is pointed and polyhedral.
Lemma 3.3. Every game v ∈ G⋆S(L) is monotone and nonnegative.
Proof. Since a monotone game is necessarily nonnegative, it suffices to check monotonic-
ity. We only need to prove that for all A,B ∈ L satisfying B ⊆ A and |B| = |A| − 1, the
inequality v(B) ≤ v(A) holds. Since both A and B are down-sets in (N,), any such
B is necessarily of the form B = A \ {i}, where i is a maximal element of A in (N,).
Note that ↓ i ⊆ A and B ∩ ↓ i = (A \ {i}) ∩ ↓ i = ⇓ i. Then supermodularity yields
v(A) = v(B ∪ ↓ i) ≥ v(B) + v(↓ i)− v(⇓ i).
Since v is 0-normalized and ↓ i ∈ J , Lemma 3.2 implies v(↓ i)− v(⇓ i) = 0.
By the decomposition (3.2) we can now write GS(L) as the direct sum of cones,
GS(L) = G
⋆
S(L) ⊕GM (L). (3.3)
Specifically, the identity (3.3) means that GS(L) = G⋆S(L) + GM (L) and G
⋆
S(L) ∩
GM (L) = {0}. Since G⋆S(L) is a pointed polyhedral cone, it is generated by its finitely-
many extreme rays.
In the next section we present a simple linear-algebraic criterion to test if a given
0-normalized supermodular game generates an extreme ray of G⋆S(L). Our result auto-
matically yields a criterion for extremality of games in GS(L): we say that a supermod-
ular game v ∈ GS(L) is extreme if v⋆ generates an extreme ray of G⋆S(L). Equivalently,
v ∈ GS(L) is extreme if, and only if, the smallest face of GS(L) to which v belongs is an
atom of the face lattice of GS(L). Indeed, faces of GS(L) are in one-to-one correspon-
dence with faces of G⋆S(L) by the relation F = F
⋆ +GM (L), where F is a face of GS(L)
and F ⋆ a face of G∗(L).
4. The cone of supermodular games
A payoff vector is any vector x := (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn . We define
x(A) :=
∑
i∈A
xi, for any A ∈ L,
6
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and we always assume x(∅) := 0. The core of v ∈ G(L) is a convex polyhedron
C(v) := {x ∈ Rn | x(N) = v(N), x(A) ≥ v(A) for each A ∈ L}.
The elements of the core C(v) have the standard game-theoretic interpretation. Namely,
no payoff vector x ∈ C(v) can be improved upon by any coalition A ∈ L. In contrast
with cores of games over Boolean lattices, the core of games over distributive lattices can
be an unbounded polyhedron. In fact, assume C(v) 6= ∅, where v ∈ G(L). Then C(v) is
bounded if and only if L is a Boolean lattice; see [10, Chapter 3.3.3] or [5]. If v ∈ GS(L),
then the polyhedron C(v) is pointed and its extreme points ext C(v) are characterized in
Theorem 4.1 below.
Recall that we always assume that N is partially ordered by . In addition we also
equip N with the total order of natural numbers ≤, so that (N,≤) becomes a chain. We
say that a permutation pi of N is compatible with (N,) if pi−1 is an order-preserving
map from (N,) onto (N,≤). Here, the intended reading is that i is a rank of player
pi(i). Define
Π := {pi | pi is a permutation compatible with (N,)} .
Compatible permutations are in bijection with maximal chains in L. Put Aπ0 := ∅ and
Aπi := {pi(1), . . . , pi(i)} for each i ∈ N . Then, with each pi ∈ Π we associate a maximal
chain Cπ := {Aπi | i ∈ N ∪{0}}. Conversely, starting from a maximal chain {A0, . . . , An}
in L, where A0 ⊆ · · · ⊆ An, there is clearly a unique pi ∈ Π such that Ai = Aπi for each
i ∈ N ∪ {0}.
A marginal vector of v ∈ G(L) and pi ∈ Π is the vector xv,π ∈ Rn whose coordinates
are defined as
x
v,π
π(i)
:= v(Aπi )− v(A
π
i−1), i ∈ N. (4.1)
It follows directly from the definition of marginal vector that
v(Aπi ) = x
v,π(Aπi ), for all pi ∈ Π and all i ∈ N ∪ {0}. (4.2)
We will make an ample use of the following identity derived from (4.2):
v(A) = xv,π(A), for all pi ∈ Π and all A ∈ C
π. (4.3)
For any v ∈ G(L) and pi ∈ Π we define
T π(v) := {A ∈ L | v(A) = xv,π(A)} .
Each coalition A ∈ T π(v) is said to be tight with respect to v and pi. Note that as a
consequence of (4.3), the following inclusion holds:
Cπ ⊆ T π(v), for all v ∈ G(L) and all pi ∈ Π. (4.4)
Theorem 4.1. Let L be a finite distributive lattice and v ∈ G(L). Then the following
are equivalent:
1. v ∈ GS(L).
2. xv,π ∈ C(v), for each pi ∈ Π.
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3. ext C(v) = {xv,π | pi ∈ Π}.
4. v(A) = min
π∈Π
xv,π(A), for each A ∈ L.
Proof. The equivalence of the first three items is well known; see [10, Theorem 3.27]. We
show that 4. implies 2. Let σ ∈ Π. Then, for all A ∈ L,
xv,σ(A) ≥ min
π∈Π
xv,π(A) = v(A).
By (4.3) we have xv,σ(N) = v(N).
From 2. to 4. It suffices to show that for each A ∈ L there exists pi ∈ Π such that
v(A) = xv,π(A). Clearly, we can always find a maximal chain Cπ in L such that A ∈ Cπ
for some pi ∈ Π. Then (4.3) yields v(A) = xv,π(A).
Remark 4.1. Many other characterizations of supermodularity can be found in the
literature in case that L is a Boolean lattice. See [21, Appendix A] for a comprehensive
list of such conditions. In particular, the implication from 2. to 1. was proved by Ichiishi
in [12]. The necessary and sufficient conditions involving specific marginal vectors can
be found in [22].
Given v ∈ G(L) let xv : Π → Rn be defined by
xv(pi) := xv,π , for all pi ∈ Π.
Further, we consider a mapping x : G(L) → (Rn)Π such that
x(v) := xv, for all v ∈ G(L).
As in [21] we call x the payoff-array transformation.
Lemma 4.1. The payoff-array transformation x is linear and injective.
Proof. Linearity is a direct consequence of the identities xv+w,π = xv,π + xw,π and
xαv,π = αxv,π , which are true for every v, w ∈ G(L), all α ∈ R and all pi ∈ Π. Assume
that v, w ∈ G(L) satisfy xv = xw and let A ∈ L. Then there exists a permutation
pi ∈ Π such that A ∈ Cπ. It follows from (4.3) and from the assumption that
v(A) = xv,π(A) = xw,π(A) = w(A).
Hence, x is injective.
We describe the range of payoff-array transformation x on the set of 0-normalized
games. For any mapping y : Π → Rn we denote yπ := y(pi) ∈ Rn, for all pi ∈ Π.
Lemma 4.2. Let y : Π → Rn. The following are equivalent:
1. There is a unique game v ∈ G⋆(L) such that y = xv.
2. These conditions are satisfied:
yπ(A) = yσ(A) for all pi, σ ∈ Π and all A ∈ C
π ∩ Cσ, (†)
yπi = 0 for all pi ∈ Π and all i ∈ N such that ↓ i ∈ C
π. (††)
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Proof. Let y = xv for some v ∈ G⋆(L). The equality in (†) is a direct consequence of
(4.3) since, for any pi, σ ∈ Π satisfying A ∈ C
π ∩ Cσ, we get
yπ(A) = xv,π(A) = v(A) = xv,σ(A) = yσ(A).
Further, let pi ∈ Π and i ∈ N satisfy ↓ i ∈ Cπ. Put A := ↓ i and observe that A ∈ J by
Proposition 2.1. This implies that the unique predecessor of A in L is A− = A \ {i} and
A− ∈ Cπ, by maximality of the chain Cπ. We obtain
yπi = x
v,π
i = x
v,π(A)− xv,π(A−) = v(A) − v(A−) = 0,
where the third equality follows from (4.3) and the fourth one from 0-normalization of v
(Lemma 3.2).
Conversely, assume that the conditions (†)–(††) are true. If a game v ∈ G⋆(L) satis-
fying y = xv exists, then it is unique by injectivity of x (Lemma 4.1). The condition (†)
guarantees that it is correct to define the game v as
v(A) := yπ(A) for all pi ∈ Π and all A ∈ C
π. (4.5)
By the definition, y = xv.
It remains to verify that v is 0-normalized. Let A ∈ J . By Proposition 2.1 it follows
that A = ↓ i for a unique i ∈ N . There exists some compatible permutation pi satisfying
A ∈ Cπ. Hence, by the definition of v and (††),
v(A) − v(A−) = yπ(A)− yπ(A−) = yπi = 0.
This means that v is 0-normalized and the proof is finished.
Remark 4.2. A mapping y : Π → Rn, whose special case is the payoff-array transfor-
mation x, can be viewed as a finite collection of possibly repeating points in Rn labeled
by permutations. This interpretation appears in [3], where a map y from a finite set into
R
n is termed a point configuration.
5. Main result
Denote
Nπ(v) := {i ∈ N | xv,πi = 0}.
The main theorem gives a simple criterion how to recognize extreme games among all
0-normalized supermodular games.
Theorem 5.1. Let v ∈ G⋆S(L) be nonzero. Then the following are equivalent:
1. The game v is extreme in G⋆S(L).
2. If y : Π → Rn satisfies the conditions
yπ(A) = yσ(A) for all pi, σ ∈ Π and all A ∈ T
π(v) ∩ T σ(v), (∗)
yπi = 0 for all pi ∈ Π and all i ∈ N
π(v), (∗∗)
then y = αxv , for some α ∈ R.
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We will briefly comment on the interpretation of Theorem 5.1. The linear-algebraic
characterization of extreme rays (Minkowski-Weyl-Farkas theorem) provides a universally
valid method for any pointed polyhedral cone. Our approach based on Theorem 5.1
uses the structure of the objects we are dealing with (supermodular functions on finite
distributive lattices). Hence, one need not to assemble all the relevant linear systems
“blindly” using the linear-algebraic technique. Indeed, the shape of such systems is fully
determined by the combinatorial core structure, which is the collection of tight sets and
null sets. Loosely speaking, a supermodular game is extreme if, and only if, the core
structure is rigid in sense that the asssociated linear system is uniquely solvable.
We prepare a lemma to be used in the proof of Theorem 5.1. For any v ∈ G(L), put
Fv :=
{
{A,B} ⊆ L | v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) = v(A) + v(B), A||B
}
. (5.1)
where
A||B means A 6⊆ B and B 6⊆ A.
For any point configuration y : Π → Rn and a game v ∈ G(L), we consider the following
property:
yπ(A) = yσ(A), for each {A,B} ∈ Fv and all pi, σ ∈ Π
such that A ∩B,B,A ∪B ∈ Cπ and A ∈ Cσ.
(5.2)
Lemma 5.1. Let v ∈ G⋆S(L) and let y : Π → R
n be such that (∗) and (∗∗) are satisfied.
Then y fullfills (†),(††), and (5.2).
Proof. Assume that y satisfies (∗) and (∗∗). It is easy to see that (†) and (††) are true.
In order to prove (5.2), let {A,B} ∈ Fv, pi, σ ∈ Π, and A ∩B,B,A ∪ B ∈ C
π, A ∈ Cσ.
Since
v(A) = v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B)− v(B) = xv,π(A ∪B) + xv,π(A ∩B)− xv,π(B) = xv,π(A),
we get A ∈ T π(v). Hence, A ∈ T π(v) ∩ Cσ and (∗) says that yπ(A) = yσ(A).
Proof. (of Theorem 5.1) Let v ∈ G⋆S(L) be nonzero. We need to show that v is extreme
if and only if the following inclusion holds true:
{y : Π → R
n | y satisfies (∗), (∗∗)} ⊆ {αxv | α ∈ R}. (5.3)
By the Minkowski-Weyl-Farkas theorem (see [1, Theorem 3.34]), v is extreme if and only
if v belongs to the one-dimensional solution space of some set of tight inequalities for
G⋆S(L) of the form w(A ∪B) + w(A ∩ B)− w(A) − w(B) ≥ 0, for all A,B ∈ L \ {∅, N}.
Define
G(v) := {w ∈ G⋆(L) | w(A ∪B) + w(A ∩B) = w(A) + w(B), for all {A,B} ∈ Fv},
where Fv is as in (5.1). Thus, extremality of v is equivalent to the condition
G(v) = {αv | α ∈ R}. (5.4)
Putting x(G(v)) := {xw | w ∈ G(v)} and using Lemma 4.1, it is immediate that (5.4)
holds if and only if
x(G(v)) = {αxv | α ∈ R}. (5.5)
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We claim that
x(G(v)) ⊇ {y : Π→ Rn | y satisfies (†), (††), and (5.2)}. (5.6)
Let y satisfies (†), (††), and (5.2). Lemma 4.2 provides a unique w ∈ G⋆(L) such that
y = xw. We need to verify that w ∈ G(v). To this end, let {A,B} ∈ Fv. Pick
permutations pi, σ ∈ Π such that A ∩B,B,A ∪ B ∈ C
π and A ∈ Cσ. Then (5.2) shows
that
w(A ∪B) + w(A ∩B)− w(B) = yπ(A) = yσ(A) = w(A).
Hence, w ∈ G(v). Finally, from (5.5), (5.6), and Lemma 5.1 we get (5.3), and the proof
is finished.
We will apply Theorem 5.1 to the cone of supermodular games on the distributive
lattice L from Example 2.1. The computations were carried out in the package Convex
for Maple [7].
Example 5.1. The cone G⋆S(L) is embedded into R
9 and its dimension is 5. It has 6
extreme rays. We will enumerate their minimal integer generators. The parentheses and
commas are omitted for the sake of brevity in what follows. Whenever vi(A) is missing,
we put vi(A) := 0.
• v1(24) = v1(234) = v1(N) = 1.
• v2(34) = v2(234) = v2(N) = 1.
• v3(23) = v3(123) = v3(234) = v3(N) = 1.
• v4(234) = v4(N) = 1.
• v5(23) = v5(24) = v5(34) = v5(123) = 1, v5(234) = v5(N) = 2.
• v6(N) = 1.
We will check that v1 is extreme using Theorem 5.1. Since there are 8 maximal chains
in L, there are 8 compatible permutations: pi1 = (2314), pi2 = (2341), pi3 = (2431), pi4 =
(3241), pi5 = (3241), pi6 = (3421), pi7 = (4231), and pi8 = (4321). Let I1 := {1, . . . , 5} and
I2 := {6, 7, 8}. There are only 2 marginal vectors associated with v1,
xv1,πi =
{
(0, 0, 0, 1) i ∈ I1,
(0, 1, 0, 0) i ∈ I2.
This means that the tight sets are
T πi(v1) =
{
{∅, 2, 3, 23, 24, 123, 234, N} i ∈ I1,
{∅, 3, 4, 24, 34, 234, N} i ∈ I2.
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Hence, the conditions (∗) and (∗∗) for y : Π → R4 are in the form of linear equalities,
for all i ∈ I1 and j ∈ I2:
yπi1 = y
πi
2 = y
πi
3 = 0 (5.7)
y
πj
1 = y
πj
3 = y
πj
4 = 0 (5.8)
yπi3 = y
πj
3 (5.9)
yπi2 + y
πi
4 = y
πj
2 + y
πj
4 (5.10)
yπi2 + y
πi
3 + y
πi
4 = y
πj
2 + y
πj
3 + y
πj
4 (5.11)
yπi1 + y
πi
2 + y
πi
3 + y
πi
4 = y
πj
1 + y
πj
2 + y
πj
3 + y
πj
4 (5.12)
The linear system above has a unique solution up to a real multiple. Observe that
yπi4 = y
πj
2 , for all i ∈ I1 and j ∈ I2, as a consequence of (5.7), (5.8), and (5.10). Let
α ∈ R. Then necessarily y = αxv1 . Thus, v1 is extreme by Theorem 5.1.
Remark 5.1. It is natural to ask for a game-theoretic meaning of the extreme super-
modular games. Since the supermodular cone is finitely-generated, every supermodular
game is a conic combination of the extreme ones. There are important solution concepts
[14], such as the core or Shapley value, which are linear maps on the supermodular cone.
Hence, such solution concepts preserve every conic combination of supermodular games.
From this viewpoint, extreme supermodular games play the role of basic building block
since they fully determine values of any linear solution concept on the supermodular
cone.
6. Faces and core structure
Let Φ(GS(L)) be the face lattice of GS(L), that is, the family of all nonempty faces
of GS(L) ordered by inclusion ⊆. In what follows we will describe the structure of this
face lattice. For any subset G ⊆ GS(L) we define
[G] :=
⋂
{F ∈ Φ(GS(L)) | F ⊇ G},
the smallest face containing G. Join ∨ and meet ∧ in Φ(GS(L)) are computed as
F ⊔G = [F ∪G] and F ⊓G = F ∩G, for all F,G ∈ Φ(GS(L)).
For any face F , let relintF be the relative interior of F . Put Φ′(GS(L)) = {relintF |
F ∈ Φ(GS(L))}. Then Φ′(GS(L)) is a lattice isomorphic to Φ(GS(L)) in which the top
is relintGS(L), the bottom is ∅, and the join and the meet are given by
relintF ∨ relintG = relint(F ⊔G),
relintF ∧ relintG = relint(F ⊓G).
The following lemma describes the relation between tight sets of v ∈ GS(L) and faces of
GS(L).
Lemma 6.1. Let v ∈ GS(L). The following holds.
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1. Let pi ∈ Π and A,B ∈ T π(v), A||B. Then {A,B} ∈ Fv.
2. Let {A,B} ∈ Fv and pi ∈ Π such that B,A∪B,A∩B ∈ Cπ. Then A ∈ T π(v)\Cπ.
Proof. 1. Let v ∈ GS(L), pi ∈ Π, and A,B ∈ T π(v) with A||B. It is well known that
T π(v) is closed under union and intersection for supermodular games. Hence, the equality
xv,π(A)+xv,π(B) = xv,π(A∪B)+xv,π(A∩B) yields v(A)+v(B) = v(A∪B)+v(A∩B).
Therefore, {A,B} ∈ Fv.
2. Let {A,B} ∈ Fv and let pi ∈ Π be such that B,A ∪B,A ∩B ∈ C
π. Then
v(A) = v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B)− v(B) = xv,π(A ∪B) + xv,π(A ∩B)− xv,π(B) = xv,π(A).
Since A||B, we get A ∈ T π(v) \ Cπ.
Games in GS(L) belong to the same face if and only if they possess identical structure
of their tight sets. Precisely:
Proposition 6.1. Let v, w ∈ GS(L). The following are equivalent.
1. v, w ∈ relintF , for some F ∈ Φ(GS(L)).
2. T π(v) = T π(w), for every pi ∈ Π.
Proof. Let v, w ∈ relintF for some F ∈ Φ(GS(L)). If they are linearly dependent, then
the statement is trivial. Assume that v and w are linearly independent and let L be the
unique line in the linear space G(L) such that v, w ∈ L. Then L∩ (F \ relintF ) = {u, u′},
where u 6= u′. Since v, w ∈ relintF there exist 0 < α, β < 1 such that v = αu+(1−α)u′
and w = βu+ (1 − β)u′.
Let pi ∈ Π and A ∈ T π(v). By linearity (Lemma 4.1) we get
αxu,π(A) + (1 − α)xu
′,π(A) = xv,π(A) = v(A) = αu(A) + (1− α)u′(A).
Since xu,π ∈ C(u) and xu
′,π ∈ C(u′), this implies xu,π(A) = u(A) and xu
′,π(A) = u′(A),
which means that A ∈ T π(u) ∩ T π(u′). Hence,
w(A) = βu(A) + (1 − β)u′(A) = βxu,π(A) + (1− β)xu
′,π(A) = xw,π(A).
This proves the inclusion T π(v) ⊆ T π(w). The opposite inclusion is established analo-
gously.
To prove the converse, assume T π(v) = T π(w) for all pi ∈ Π. It suffices to show
that Fv = Fw, where Fv is as in (5.1), since this already implies existence of a unique
F ∈ Φ(GS(L)) such that v, w ∈ relintF . First, we prove
Fv ⊆ Fw. (6.1)
Let {A,B} ∈ Fv. There exists pi ∈ Π such that A∩B,A,A∪B ∈ Cπ. Hence, A ∈ T π(v)
and
v(B) = v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B)− v(A)
= xv,π(A ∪B) + xv,π(A ∩B)− xv,π(A) = xv,π(B),
which means B ∈ T π(v) = T π(w). Then A,B ∈ T π(w), and by Lemma 6.1 (1) {A,B} ∈
Fw, so (6.1) holds. The proof of inclusion Fw ⊆ Fv is analogous.
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Let S(L) be the lattice of all sublattices of L ordered by set inclusion ⊆. The core
structure of v ∈ GS(L) (cf. [13] and [21, Definition 4]) is the mapping T (v) : Π → S(L)
defined as
pi ∈ Π 7→ T
π(v).
The above definition is correct since T π(v) is a lattice as a consequence of Lemma 6.1.
By Proposition 6.1, T (v) = T (w) for all v, w ∈ relintF . Hence, we may define a mapping
T : Φ(GS(L)) → S(L)
Π
by
T (F ) := T (v), for any v ∈ relintF .
We will order the elements of S(L)Π by the product order ⊆ inherited from S(L).
Specifically, for any U ,V ∈ S(L)Π ,
U ⊆ V whenever Uπ ⊆ Vπ, for all pi ∈ Π.
Proposition 6.2. The mapping T is injective, order-reversing, and its inverse T −1 is
also order-reversing.
Proof. T injective is an easy consequence of Proposition 6.1. We will prove that T is an
order-reversing map. Let F1 ⊆ F2 be faces of GS(L) and select arbitrarily v1 ∈ relintF1
and v2 ∈ relintF2. We want to show
T π(v2) ⊆ T
π(v1) for every pi ∈ Π. (6.2)
Let pi ∈ Π and A ∈ T π(v2). Using (4.1), this is equivalent to saying that v2 is a solution
of the equation in v: ∑
i∈A
(v(Aππ−1(i))− v(A
π
π−1(i−1))) = v(A). (6.3)
As this equation is satisfied by all games in relintF2 and only these ones, it follows that
(6.3) is implied by the equalities determining relintF2, that is, those corresponding to
Fv2 . As F1 ⊆ F2, relintF1 is determined by a superset of equalities, and therefore the
equality (6.3) is also satisfied by v1. Hence A ∈ T π(v1).
To show that T −1 is order-reversing, let T π(v1) ⊆ T π(v2) for all pi ∈ Π, where v1 ∈
relintF1 and v2 ∈ relintF2, for some faces F1 and F2. We will prove that F2 ⊆ F1, which
is the same as Fv1 ⊆ Fv2 . Let {A,B} ∈ Fv1 . Then there exists pi s.t. A∩B,A,A∪B ∈ C
π.
Hence, by Lemma 6.1 (2), B ∈ T π(v1)\Cπ, hence B ∈ T π(v2)\Cπ. As A ∈ Cπ ⊆ T π(v2)
and A‖B, by Lemma 6.1 (1), {A,B} ∈ Fv2 .
Corollary 6.1. T is a lattice isomorphism from the face lattice Φ(GS(L)) onto a sub-
lattice of S(L)Π .
Remark 6.1. The same reasoning can be applied to the face lattice of all 0-normalized
supermodular games, Φ(G⋆S(L)). Indeed, it follows from the direct sum decomposition
(3.3) that Φ(G⋆S(L)) and Φ(GS(L)) are isomorphic lattices.
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7. Facets of the cone of supermodular games
Kuipers et al. [13, Corollary 11] characterised those supermodular inequalities which
determine the facets of GS(L) when L = 2N . Specifically, the facet-determining inequal-
ities are
v(A ∪ {i, j})− v(A ∪ {i})− v(A ∪ {j}) + v(A) ≥ 0 (7.1)
for all A ⊆ N and every pair of distinct i, j ∈ N \ A. The next theorem identifies the
facets of the cone GS(L), for any L. Since L is the lattice of down-sets of a poset (N,),
if A ∈ L and i ∈ N are such that ⇓ i ⊆ A, then A ∪ {i} ∈ L.
Theorem 7.1. The facets of GS(L) are given by the inequalities of the form
v(A ∪ {i, j})− v(A ∪ {i})− v(A ∪ {j}) + v(A) ≥ 0 (7.2)
with A ∈ L and distinct i, j ∈ N \A such that ⇓ i ⊆ A and ⇓ j ⊆ A.
Proof. Observe that, since the lattice L is ranked1, if A and A ∪B with B ⊆ N \A are
in L, then A ∪ {i} ∈ L for some i ∈ B.
First, we show that any supermodular inequality can be derived from those of type
(7.2). Consider
v(A ∪B)− v(A) − v(B) + v(A ∩B) ≥ 0, (A,B ∈ L) (7.3)
with |A∆B| > 2. We show by induction on |A∆B| that (7.3) can be derived from (7.2).
First we establish the result for |A∆B| = 3. Take
v(A ∪ {i, j, k})− v(A ∪ {i, j})− v(A ∪ {k}) + v(A) ≥ 0, (7.4)
with A ∪ {i, j}), A ∪ {k} ∈ L. Supposing A′ := A ∪ {i} ∈ L (by the preliminary remark,
either A ∪ {i} or A ∪ {j} belongs to L), we have by the assumption
v(A′ ∪ {j, k})− v(A′ ∪ {j})− v(A′ ∪ {k}) + v(A′) ≥ 0,
v(A ∪ {i, k})− v(A ∪ {i})− v(A ∪ {k}) + v(A) ≥ 0,
whose sum yields (7.4).
We suppose that the result holds for |A∆B| = k, where k ≥ 3, and let us prove it for
|A∆B| = k + 1. Consider the inequality
v(A∪{i1, . . . , iℓ, . . . , ik+1})−v(A∪{i1, . . . , iℓ})−v(A∪{iℓ+1, . . . , ik+1})+v(A) ≥ 0, (7.5)
with A∪ {i1, . . . , iℓ}, A∪ {iℓ+1, . . . , ik+1} ∈ L. Put A′ := A∪ {iℓ+1} ∈ L. It follows from
the assumption that
v(A′ ∪ {i1, . . . , iℓ, iℓ+2, . . . , ik+1})− v(A
′ ∪ {i1, . . . , iℓ})− v(A
′ ∪ {iℓ+2, . . . , ik+1}) + v(A
′) ≥ 0
v(A ∪ {i1, . . . , iℓ+1})− v(A ∪ {iℓ+1})− v(A ∪ {i1, . . . , iℓ}) + v(A) ≥ 0,
whose sum gives (7.5).
1A ranked (also graded) lattice is a lattice in which all the maximal chains have the same cardinality.
15
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Second, we prove that no inequality of type (7.2) is redundant. It is clearly sufficient
to prove the result for the Boolean lattice L = 2N . Consider (7.2) for fixed A, i, j and
define the following game vA,i,j for an arbitrary ε > 0:
vA,i,j(B) :=


ε if B = A ∪ {i},
0 if B ⊂ A ∪ {i} or B = A ∪ {j} or B ⊃ A ∪ {i},
−ε otherwise.
We claim that vA,i,j satisfies all the inequalities (7.2) except the one with A, i, j. This
proves that the latter inequality is not redundant.
Proof of the claim. Put v := vA,i,j , i := 1, j := 2. Clearly,
v(A ∪ {1, 2})− v(A ∪ {1})− v(A ∪ {2}) + v(A) = −ε < 0.
Consider the quantity
∆(B, i, j) := v(B ∪ {i, j})− v(B ∪ {i})− v(B ∪ {j}) + v(B).
We first study ∆(B, i, j) when one of the terms has value ε. If v(B ∪ {i, j}) = ε or
v(B) = ε, the other terms can be 0 or −ε, so that ∆(B, i, j) ≥ 0. If v(B ∪ {i}) = ε (i.e.,
B = A, i = 1), then v(B ∪ {j}) = −ε, unless j = 2. Supposing this is not the case, we
have then v(B ∪ {i, j}) = v(B) = 0. Hence, ∆(B, i, j) = 0.
We study now ∆(B, i, j) when the values of the terms are either 0 or −ε. Suppose
that v(B ∪ {i}) = v(B ∪ {j}) = 0. Both B ∪ {i} and B ∪ {j} are either proper subsets
of A ∪ {1} or proper supersets of it. Then both B and B ∪ {i, j} are either subsets or
supersets of A ∪ {1}, and the equality is impossible since we excluded the value ε for v.
Therefore, v(B∪{i, j}) = v(B) = 0, and ∆(B, i, j) = 0. Suppose now that v(B∪{i}) = 0
and v(B ∪ {j}) = −ε. Then either B ∪ {i} ⊂ A ∪ {1} or B ∪ {i} ⊃ A ∪ {1}, and in both
cases j 6∈ A ∪ {1}. It follows that, if B ∪ {i} ⊂ A ∪ {1}, then B ⊂ A ∪ {1}, therefore
v(B) = 0, yielding ∆(B, i, j) ≥ 0. If B ∪ {i} ⊃ A ∪ {1}, then v(B ∪ {i, j}) = 0, hence
the same conclusion holds. Finally, suppose v(B ∪{i}) = v(B ∪{j}) = −ε. Then, in any
case, ∆(B, i, j) ≥ 0.
Example 7.1. Let (N,) and L be as in Example 2.1. Applying Theorem 7.1 we see
that the facets of GS(L) are in bijection with the linear inequalities of the form
1. v({i, j}) ≥ v({i}) + v({j}), for all distinct i, j ∈ N \ {1},
2. v(A∪B)+v(A∩B) ≥ v(A)+v(B), for all distinct A,B ∈ L satisfying |A| = |B| = 2,
3. v(N) + v({2, 3}) ≥ v({1, 2, 3}) + v({2, 3, 4}).
Thus, there are 7 facets, whereas the cone GS(2
N ) of supermodular games on the Boolean
lattice 2N has
(
n
2
)
· 2n−2 = 24 facets by (7.1).
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